The much anticipated report on the circumstances that led to the Tempi train collision and the tragic death of 57 people two years ago was released by the Greek Aviation & Railway Safety Investigation Agency (HARSIA) on Thursday, just one day before the 2nd anniversary of the disaster on 28. February 2023.
The 178-page report published in English demonstrates the mix of chronic “deficiencies” that led to the tragedy, including among others, the serious safety deficiencies at the Greek Railway Network managing company (OSE), the long-standing indifference of governments to the Greek railway, the series of human errors, the deficiencies in equipment and maintenance of infrastructure.
The reports also confirms concerned that interventions made to the scene of the accident compromised the discovery of vital information and hampered investigations into the crash, which involved a freight train traveling south from Thessaloniki to Athens plowing head-on into a passenger train coming in the opposite direction.
The hardcore which was laid down over the debris may have extinguished traces of liquids and materials that contributed to the blast, which is believed to have cost the lives of between seven to eight of the 57 victims, with the rest being killed by the impact of the two trains.
The cargo being transported by the freight train has been the subject of much speculation and multiple investigations after trace amounts of xylene and benzene were detected at the scene of the accident.
The report notes that the origin of the pyrosphere recorded after the collision has not yet been clarified and requires further investigation by specialized scientific centers abroad. It is believed that fuel of unknown origin was found, while 5-7 people lost their lives not from the collision but from the explosion. Meanwhile, the German institute that studies the retarding capacity of the materials of the wagons has not yet completed its research.
The findings revealed serious safety deficiencies at OSE, deficiencies in staff training and evaluation, as well as malfunctions of the Railway Regulatory Authority (RAS), which has supervisory authority.
The EODASAAM report also painted a scathing picture of chaos in the aftermath of the accident.
“There was no actual coordination, whether at operational or strategical level, of the different services at the scene of the collision. Each service continued to operate under its own orders, initiatives, and personnel without any interaction at the organizational level. One particular result of this is the fact that no proper mapping of the accident investigation site was performed,” the report said.
On the cause of the collision itself, the report said that the sequence of events which led to an under-trained stationmaster at the understaffed Larissa station accidentally routing passenger train IC-62 onto the same track as freight train 63503 on the same track when they were traveling in opposite directions on the night of February 28, 2023, “was highly affected by a general lack of strict application of the prescribed structured communication methodology.”
“Furthermore, the methodology prescribed by the Greek rules is outdated compared to more recent international standards,” it said, adding that the way the Hellenic Railways Organization (OSE) “manages the competence of its station masters does not guarantee that they are competent in the safety-related tasks for which they are responsible, under all conditions.”
